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The Ombudsman as a Monitor of  
Human Rights in 
Canadian Federal Corrections 
 
Howard Sapers* & Ivan Zinger**  
 
Introduction:  
A Human Rights Approach to Corrections 
 
An important challenge for many countries, including 
advanced democracies, is guaranteeing the human rights of its 
prisoners.  The quality of regard to, and respect for, human 
rights may impact on the success of prisoners’ reintegration 
and participation in society.  A good balance between internal 
and external monitoring can prevent human rights 
breakdowns, detect violations when they occur, and rectify the 
situation to ensure that they do not happen again.  Striking the 
appropriate balance between internal and external monitoring 
is not easy.  Canada, like many other countries, has struggled 
with establishing and maintaining this balance.  Even so, 
accountability and transparency in decision-making remains a 
fundamental challenge of a compliant human rights monitoring 
system. 
The best approach to ensure that the rule of law is upheld 
in corrections is to conceptualize the business of corrections as 
a human rights business.1  When government has exceptional 
authority over its citizens, the potential for abuse of powers is 
great and the protections of fundamental rights must be a core 
preoccupation of those empowered and trusted with such 
exceptional powers.  In a correctional context, every aspect of a 
prisoner’s life is heavily regulated by correctional authorities.  
Correctional authorities make thousands of decisions every 
 
  *     BA. Correctional Investigator of Canada. 
  **  LL.B, Ph.D. Executive Director and General Counsel, Office of the 
Correctional Investigator. 
1. Ivan Zinger, Human Rights Compliance and the Role of External 
Prison Oversight, 48 CAN. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 127, 132 (Apr. 
2006) (Can.). 
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day, which impact on prisoners’ fundamental rights (e.g., use of 
force, segregation, searches, transfers, and visiting).  Routine 
daily decisions, such as whether prisoners have contact with 
family and friends, whether and how they can practice their 
religion or access medical services, and when they can eat and 
sleep, are all regulated by correctional authorities.  Without 
recognizing that the business of corrections is all about 
promoting and monitoring respect for human rights, 
preventing human rights violations, and detecting and 
remedying human rights violations, systemic abuses of power 
are unavoidable. 
 
I. The History and Key Features of the Public Sector 
Ombudsman 
 
The word ombudsman is Swedish and refers to a 
representative or agent of the people.2  In 1809, Sweden 
became the first country to establish a Parliamentary 
ombudsman’s office with the responsibility to investigate 
citizen complaints against public officials.3  More than a 
century passed before the idea was taken up by another 
Scandinavian country, Finland, which created an office in 
1919.  During the last four decades, there has been explosive 
growth in the spread of ombudsman schemes, particularly in 
Western Europe and the Americas.  In 1974, the International 
Bar Association approved a resolution defining an ombudsman 
as: 
 
An office provided for by the constitution or by an 
action of the legislature or parliament and 
headed by an independent, high-level public 
official who is responsible to the legislature of 
parliament, who receives complaints from 
aggrieved persons against government agencies, 
officials, an employees or who acts on his motion, 
and who has the power to investigate, 
 
2. Financial Ombudsman Service, What is an Ombudsman?, 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/417_EduPackCard-2.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
3. BYRON NORDSTROM, THE HISTORY OF SWEDEN 66 (2002).   
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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recommend corrective action and issue reports.4  
 
The features common to all Ombudsman offices, which make 
them attractive as mechanisms for complaint resolution, have 
been described by the British and Irish Ombudsman 
Association (BIOA) as follows: 
 
 Ombudsmen offer access to redress not available for 
cases which might not be considered by the Courts. 
 
 Ombudsmen are independent and impartial and 
conduct their investigations in private. 
 
 Ombudsmen are free to complainants. 
 
 Ombudsmen can usually take account of what is fair 
and reasonable and are not bound by interpretation 
of the law or precedent. 
 
 It is not necessary for the complainants to obtain 
professional advice prior to bringing a complaint to 
an Ombudsman. 
 
 Compliance with an Ombudsman’s recommendation 
is secured by a variety of means – by law, by 
contract, by moral force and the standing of the 
Ombudsman. 
 
 Ombudsman schemes make extensive use of 
informal settlements and conciliation; some offer 
access to mediation. 
 
 Ombudsmen level the playing field between the 
under-represented complainant and large and 
powerful organizations. 
 
 Ombudsmen are inquisitorial, not adversarial, and 
 
4. W. Haller, The Place of the Ombudsman in the World Community 29 
(1988) (Fourth International Ombudsman Conference Papers) (Canberra). 
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investigations are conducted in private. Ombudsmen 
can examine and interview witnesses and use 
professional experts where appropriate. The 
procedure for investigations can be tailored to the 
circumstances of the case.5 
 
Based on the above features, it is clear that ombudsmen 
have dual roles.  While they provide redress for individual 
grievances, they are also concerned with the improvement of 
service delivery standards.6  An ombudsman is therefore not 
merely an agent of redress; he or she also has a quality-control 
function.  Through investigating individual cases, ombudsmen 
may highlight weaknesses in practices, rules and attitudes.  
Discovering these weaknesses is of advantage to both 
complainants and those who have not complained because the 
resulting improvements in the system provide a generalized 
benefit.  These two roles do not conflict, nor should they be 
separated.7  Any office that receives and investigates 
complaints is only doing half its job if its casework experience 
is not used to provide comprehensive feedback to the 
organization investigated.  For example, such feedback could 
relate to improvements in the way internal complaints are 
dealt with, so that fewer complaints would make their way to 
the ombudsman.  Feedback could also lead to improvements 
when investigations reveal systemic problems or failures. 
 
II. Human Rights in Canadian Federal Corrections 
 
International and domestic human rights instruments 
affirm that persons deprived of their liberty have the right to 
be treated with fairness and humanity, and have the right not 
to be subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  The best argument for observing human rights 
standards is not merely that they are required by international 
or domestic law, but that they actually work better than any 
 
5. BRITISH & IRISH OMBUDSMAN ASS’N (BIOA), GUIDE TO PRINCIPLES OF 
GOOD GOVERNANCE (Oct. 2009), available at   
http://www.bioa.org.uk/docs/BIOAGovernanceGuideOct09.pdf. 
6. MARY SENEVIRATNE, OMBUDSMEN: PUBLIC SERVICES AND 
ADMINISTRATION JUSTICE 17 (2002).   
7. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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known alternative—for offenders, for correctional staff and for 
society at large.  Compliance with human rights obligations 
increases, though does not guarantee, the odds of releasing a 
more responsible citizen.  By respecting the human rights of 
prisoners, we convey a strong message that everyone, 
regardless of their circumstance, race, social status, gender or 
religion, is to be treated with respect and dignity. 
The human rights standards and principles outlined in 
international instruments, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,8 the Convention Against Torture9 
and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners,10 should be reflected in all rules regulating 
correctional practices and procedures. 
 The international human rights obligations pertaining to 
Corrections can be summarized in four key principles: 
 
 The safety of correctional staff, prisoners and society 
at large is paramount. 
 
 Prisoners retain the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all members of society, except those that 
are necessarily removed as a consequence of 
sentence. 
 
 Decisions affecting prisoners are made in a fair and 
forthright manner. 
 
 Correctional authorities apply the ―least restrictive 
measures‖ consistent with public safety.11 
 
 
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
Can. T.S. 47 (1976). 
9. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, Can. T.S. 36 (1987). 
10. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ECOSOC 
Res. 664 (XXIV) (July 31, 1957), ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 13, 1977). 
11. Howard Sapers, Office of the Correctional Investigator of Canada, 
The Challenges of Oversight in Federal Corrections, International 
Corrections and Prisons Association Annual Conference (Oct. 2008), available 
at http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/comm/presentations/presentations200810-
eng.aspx. 
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 In the long-term, failure to comply with any of these four 
principles jeopardizes public safety because it hinders the 
ability of correctional professionals to effect changes in 
prisoners—in other words, it hinders rehabilitation of 
prisoners.  Prisoners may attend very good rehabilitation 
programs; however, if they live within an environment 
disrespectful of human rights, any gain that may have been 
made through correctional intervention will quickly erode or 
even dissipate completely.  In sum, an environment respectful 
of human rights is conducive to positive changes, whereas an 
environment disrespectful of human rights will have the 
opposite effect; it will harden criminals by reinforcing pro-
criminal attitudes and disrespect for authority.12 
 
III. The Development of the Specialized Prison Ombudsman 
 
The establishment of specialized prison Ombudsman 
offices is relatively recent, but it continues to gain popularity 
around the world.  Scotland and Northern Ireland are 
examples of jurisdictions that have recently established a 
specialized prison Ombudsman office.  Many countries view 
such an office as one of the most effective models of external 
oversight to address prisoners’ complaints and grievances.  The 
specialized expertise and close working relationship with 
correctional authorities and stakeholders make prison 
Ombudsman offices oversight bodies capable of unbiased 
investigations and timely resolution of offender complaints. 
Historically, most prison Ombudsman offices have been 
created as a direct result of well-publicized serious human 
rights violations and to address the chronic inability of internal 
prison complaint and grievance mechanisms to fairly and 
effectively respond to offenders’ complaints.  Canada is no 
exception in this regard. 
In 1971, Kingston Penitentiary experienced one of the 
bloodiest riots in its history.  Five correctional officers were 
taken hostage and a group of prisoners were brutally 
tortured—two of the prisoners died, thirteen others were 
seriously injured, and part of Kingston Penitentiary was 
destroyed.  Following the riot, many of the inmates implicated 
 
12. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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in the disturbance were transferred to Millhaven Penitentiary.  
Subsequently, correctional staff at Millhaven Penitentiary 
assaulted eighty-six offenders involved in the riot, causing 
injuries of various degrees.  A Royal Commission of Inquiry, 
chaired by Justice Swackhamer, was appointed to examine 
these tragic events, and it made strong recommendations to 
improve the management and operations of the Canadian 
Penitentiary Service, as it was then known.13  The Office of the 
Correctional Investigator (―OCI‖) was established in 1973 
pursuant to Part II of the Inquiries Act,14 in response to Justice 
Swackhamer’s sweeping recommendations for strengthening 
the accountability and oversight of the federal correctional 
system. 
The Office was finally entrenched into legislation on 
November 1, 1992, with the enactment of the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act (CCRA).15 
 
IV. The Correctional Investigator: Canada’s Federal Prison 
Ombudsman 
 
The Office of the Correctional Investigator investigates 
and attempts to resolve individual federal offender complaints.  
As well, it has a responsibility to review and make 
recommendations on the Correctional Service of Canada’s 
policies and procedures associated with individual complaints.  
In this way, systemic areas of concern can be identified and 
appropriately addressed. 
The ―function‖ of the Correctional Investigator is 
purposefully broad, as detailed in sections 167 and 170 of the 
CCRA: 
 
167. (1) It is the function of the Correctional 
Investigator to conduct investigations into the 
problems of offenders related to decisions, 
recommendations, acts or omissions of the 
 
13. MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN DISTURBANCES AT KINGSTON 
PENITENTIARY DURING APRIL, 1971 (1972) (Can.). 
14. Inquiries Act, R.S.C., ch. I 13 (1985). 
15. Corrections and Conditional Release Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 20, available 
at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-44.6/index.html. 
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Commissioner [of Corrections] or any person 
under the control and management of, or 
performing services for or on behalf of, the 
Commissioner, that affect offenders either 
individually or as a group. 
 
170. (1) The Correctional Investigator may 
commence an investigation 
 
a) on the receipt of a complaint by or on 
behalf of an offender; 
b) at the request of the Minister; or 
c) on the initiative of the Correctional 
Investigator. 
 
(2) The Correctional Investigator has full 
discretion as to 
 
a) whether an investigation should be 
conducted in relation to any particular 
complaint or request; 
b) how every investigation is to be 
carried out; and 
c) whether any investigation should be 
terminated before its completion.16 
 
These sections provide the Office with broad authority to 
identify, define and investigate a wide range of ―problems‖ 
brought forward by, or concerning, federal inmates or parolees, 
provided only that such problems result from the conduct of 
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) staff and 
representatives.  Such conduct may include everything from 
board policy initiatives to everyday, operational decision-
making by staff on the institutional ranges. 
The Office can initiate an inquiry on the basis of a 
complaint or on its own initiative.  The Correctional 
Investigator has complete discretion in deciding whether to 
conduct an investigation and how to carry out that 
 
16. Id. §§ 167, 170. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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investigation. 
The Office addresses the vast majority of inmates’ 
complaints at the institutional level, through discussion and 
negotiation.  When a resolution is not reached at the 
institution, the matter is referred to regional or national 
headquarters, depending upon the area of concern, with a 
specific recommendation for further review and corrective 
action. 
Whenever a matter has not been adequately addressed, the 
Office’s findings and recommendations are presented to the 
Commissioner of Corrections.  That report provides 
comprehensive information supporting the Office’s conclusions 
and recommendations. 
If at this level the Commissioner, in the opinion of the 
Correctional Investigator, fails to address the matter in a 
reasonable and timely fashion, it is referred to the Minister of 
Public Safety and eventually may be detailed within an Annual 
or Special Report. 
In the course of an investigation, the Office’s staff has very 
significant authority to enter premises and to acquire 
information from files or individuals.  The Correctional 
Investigator may hold hearings, and may summon and 
examine under oath any person who is able to furnish any 
information related to a matter being investigated.  This 
authority is tempered by strict legal rules limiting the 
investigators’ ability to disclose the information acquired.  A 
vital assurance to all those with whom the Office deals, this 
confidentiality underlines the independence of the Ombudsman 
model from other forms of investigation and adjudication. 
The Correctional Investigator is, above all, an 
Ombudsman.  This involves a fundamental balancing of 
authority and functions, which has long characterised the 
Ombudsman approach.  Legislation arms the Office with the 
operational tools and discretion to carry out thorough 
investigations on a broad range of offender problems.17  
Nevertheless, the Correctional Investigator may only 
recommend solutions to offender problems.  Recommendations 
may be directed toward local institutional staff and 
management, the regional correctional authorities and the 
 
17. Sapers, supra note 11. 
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national headquarters.  Recommendations may be made 
directly to the Commissioner of Corrections and the responsible 
Minister and, ultimately, to both Houses of Parliament. 
As with other Ombudsman agencies, this balancing gives 
rise to two features that underpin effectiveness as compared to 
other investigative or adjudicative mechanisms: 
 
 enhanced and direct access to information 
permits the Office to bring timely closure to 
most matters, usually at the institutional 
level; and, 
 
 the focus on persuasion that flows from the 
power only to recommend means that the 
Office: 
 
o tends to address the most urgent and 
significant unresolved matters in 
statutory reports; and 
 
o must attempt to buttress findings and 
recommendations with a thorough and 
compelling review of supporting 
information.18  
 
It will be the relevance and weight of the evidence that is 
provided, as well as the clarity and strength of conclusions, 
that determine the outcome of efforts. 
The Office of the Correctional Investigator currently has 
twenty-four staff members, with twenty directly involved as 
intake officers, investigators, coordinators or directors, in the 
day-to-day handling of inmate complaints.  The Office receives 
between six and eight thousand offender inquiries and 
complaints annually.  For fiscal year 2008-09, approximately 
two thousand were addressed through an ―immediate response‖ 
(the provision of information, assistance or referral) and 
approximately four thousand resulted in an inquiry or 
investigation.19  The investigative staff last year spent in 
 
18. Id. 
19.  OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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excess of two hundred days in federal penitentiaries conducting 
interviews with more than 2,500 offenders, and met with 
inmate organizations at every institution in the country.20 
Of the approximate 6,000 offenders’ inquiries and 
complaints received by the Office in fiscal year 2008-09, the ten 
most frequent areas of concern identified by offenders were: 
 
1. HEALTH CARE (851). 
2. TRANSFER (447). 
3.  ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION (423). 
4.  CELL EFFECTS (416). 
5.  CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT (373). 
6.  STAFF PERFORMANCE (357). 
7.  VISITS (311). 
8.  CASE PREPARATION (257). 
9.  INFORMATION - ACCESS AND CORRECTION 
(253). 
10. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE (209).21 
 
V. Strengthening External Monitoring in Canada 
 
There are three areas where external oversight could be 
enhanced to strengthen Canada’s compliance with its domestic 
and international human rights obligations. 
 
A. Independent Adjudication of Administrative Segregation 
Decisions 
 
In the summer of 1994, the OCI received several 
complaints related to an intervention by an all-male 
Emergency Response Team (ERT) at the Prison for Women 
(P4W), Canada’s only penitentiary for women at the time.  The 
complainants alleged excessive use of force by the ERT, illegal 
and dehumanizing strip searches of women by male 
correctional officers, unlawful long-term administrative 
 
OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR 2008-09 (2009), available at 
http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.aspx.  
20. Id. 
21. Id. (follow ―Annex A: Statistics‖). 
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segregation, and inhumane and punitive conditions of 
confinement.  The OCI conducted an investigation, which also 
included reviews of the CSC’s own internal investigation and 
its videotape of the ERT intervention.  On February 14, 1995, 
given the gravity of the human rights violations, Ron Stewart, 
Correctional Investigator (CI) at the time, issued a Special 
Report, which concluded the following: 
 
 the force used was excessive; 
 
 the involvement of an all-male ERT was 
degrading and dehumanizing to the women 
involved; 
 
 the conditions of confinement were punitive 
and inconsistent with legislative provisions 
governing administrative segregation; and, 
 
 the internal investigation conducted by the 
CSC was at best incomplete, inconclusive and 
self-serving.22 
 
In addition to containing a number of recommendations on 
significant policy changes in the areas of investigations, 
administrative segregation and the deployment of all-male 
ERTs, the Special Report also recommended financial 
compensation for the women involved.23  On February 21, 1995, 
the Special Report was tabled before Parliament by the 
Minister, who in turn announced that an independent inquiry 
would be convened.  Later that evening, a major television 
network aired the video of women at P4W being strip searched 
by an all-male Emergency Response Team, and Canadians 
were shocked by what they saw. 
On April 10, 1995, Madame Justice Louise Arbour, former 
UN High Commissioner of Human Rights and former member 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, was appointed as 
Commissioner for the Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
 
22. RON STEWART, OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR, SPECIAL 
REPORT (Feb. 14, 1995) (Can.).  
23. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston.  Justice Arbour’s 
report confirmed the conclusions of the OCI with respect to the 
incident under investigation, as well as the recommended 
compensation for the women involved.24 
In her report, Justice Arbour stated: ―my objective in 
bringing forward recommendations on various aspects of 
corrections is to assist the correctional system in coming into 
the fold of two Canadian constitutional ideals – the protection 
of individual rights and the entitlement to equality.‖25  Justice 
Arbour also commented on the value of a prison Ombudsman to 
foster a culture of human rights within the CSC: ―Of all the 
outside observers of the Correctional Service, the Correctional 
Investigator is in a unique position both to assist in the 
resolution of individual problems, and to comment publicly on 
the systemic shortcomings of the Service.  Of all the internal 
and external mechanisms or agencies designed to make the 
Correctional Service open and accountable, the Office of the 
Correctional Investigator is by far the most efficient and the 
best equipped to discharge that function.‖26 
In her 1996 report, Madame Justice Arbour concluded that 
―the management of administrative segregation that I have 
observed is inconsistent with the Charter culture which 
permeates other branches of the administration of the criminal 
justice.‖27  She went on to say: ―I see no alternative to the 
current overuse of prolonged segregation but to recommend 
that it be placed under the control and supervision of the 
courts.  Failing a willingness to put segregation under judicial 
supervision, I would recommend that segregation decisions 
made at an institutional level be subject to confirmation within 
five days by an independent adjudicator.‖28 
For over a decade, the CSC has rejected independent 
adjudication and continues to this day to argue that an 
enhanced internal segregation review process can achieve 
fairness and compliance with the rule of law.  Since the Arbour 
 
24. SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN EVENTS AT THE PRISON FOR WOMEN IN KINGSTON (1996) 
(Can.), available at http://www.elizabethfry.ca/arbour/ArbourReport.pdf. 
25. Id. at vi. 
26. Id. at 194. 
27. Id. at 190. 
28. Id. at 191. 
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Report of 1996, several other internal and external reports 
have all observed similar fairness and non-compliance issues as 
highlighted in the Arbour Report, and have made similar 
recommendations for the independent adjudication of 
segregation cases.29  Most interestingly, in 2004, the 
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
Canada undertook its own evaluation and again found that the 
Service’s repeated attempts to achieve compliance with the rule 
of ,law and fair decision-making through operational 
enhancements to administrative segregation processes did not 
yield sufficient, sustained or desired results.  The Department 
recommended to the CSC’s Executive Committee that it 
implement and test models of independent adjudication, but 
not surprisingly, again this recommendation was rejected.  
More recently, the Office of the Correctional Investigator 
recommended that the Correctional Service immediately 
implement independent adjudication of segregation placements 
of inmates with mental health concerns.30 
Meanwhile, the situation of segregated prisoners (many of 
whom are mentally ill) has deteriorated since 1996, and far too 
many lament in harsh conditions of confinement.  Statistics 
from the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) indicate that it 
made a staggering 7,619 placements in administrative 
segregation, and that on any given day, there were, on average, 
approximately 904 offenders in segregation during fiscal year 
2008-09.  The number of placements is astonishing given that 
the total incarcerated population in the CSC’s maximum- and 
medium-security institutions that have segregation units is 
less than 10,000 prisoners.  Moreover, a snapshot of the 
 
29. See, e.g., CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, PROTECTING THEIR 
RIGHTS: A SYSTEMIC REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES FOR 
FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN (2003) (Can.); CROSS GENDER MONITORING 
PROJECT, THIRD AND FINAL ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (Report submitted to the 
Correctional Service of Canada by Thérèse Lajeunesse and Associates Ltd.); 
MICHAEL JACKSON, JUSTICE BEHIND THE WALLS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADIAN 
PRISONS (2002) (Can.); Report of the Sub-Committee on the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act of the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Justice and Human Rights, A Work in Progress (2000) (Can.); M. Yalden, 
Correctional Service of Canada, Human Rights and Corrections: A Strategic 
Model (1997). 
30.  OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR 2007-08 (2008), available at 
http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20072008-eng.aspx. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/9
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segregated offender population indicates that on April 12, 2009, 
almost 37 percent (311 of 848) of segregated offenders had 
spent over sixty days in administrative segregation.  It is clear 
that independent adjudication is a viable solution to ensure 
that fair decisions are made and that least restrictive 
alternatives to administrative segregation are applied 
promptly and consistently. 
 
B. The Correctional Investigator’s Reporting Relationship 
 
The second area of external oversight that could be 
enhanced deals with the reporting relationship of the OCI to 
Parliament.  In the case of both annual reports and urgent 
reports, the Correctional Investigator submits the reports to 
the federal Minister of Public Safety who, in turn, must submit 
the reports to both Houses of Parliament within thirty sitting 
days.  A key element of any Ombudsman operation is the 
independence of the office from the government organization it 
is mandated to investigate.  This independence has 
traditionally been established and maintained by having the 
Ombudsman report directly to the legislature.  The current 
reporting relationship of the Correctional Investigator through 
the federal Minister of Public Safety, given the Minister’s 
direct responsibility for federal Corrections, has been an 
ongoing point of debate within the corrections field for a long 
time.  Since its creation in 1973, the OCI has advocated for the 
establishment of direct legislative reporting (i.e., not via the 
Minister).31  Reporting directly to Parliament is more 
consistent with the traditional role of Ombudsman offices, 
within and outside Canada.  It would help ensure that the 
Correctional Investigator’s independence is never questioned 
and truly establish the Office at arms length from the agency it 
oversees. 
 
 
31. OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR, ANNUAL REPORT 1973-74 
(1974) (Can.). 
15
2010] CANADIAN FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 1527 
C. Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
(OPCAT) 
 
The OPCAT was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in December 2002.32  Canada was a member of the 
group that drafted the OPCAT and voted in favour of its 
adoption.  Canada has been a signatory to the Convention 
against Torture since 1987, but has yet to sign and ratify the 
OPCAT.  As of September 2009, there were forty-nine State 
Parties and twenty-four Signatories to the OPCAT. 
The OPCAT establishes a system of regular visits 
undertaken by independent international and national bodies 
to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to 
prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  The OPCAT’s objective is to prevent 
torture through dual proactive inspection mechanisms. 
The OPCAT compels State parties to permit visits to any 
place within their jurisdiction where persons are deprived of 
their liberty by a public authority.  This mandate, to prevent 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, is 
accomplished by: 
 
 Creating both an independent international 
and national oversight mechanism; 
 
 Establishing a system of regular visits 
conducted by both mechanisms; and 
 
 Allowing inspections in places where people 
are deprived of their liberty. 
 
The creation of a national review mechanism as described 
in the OPCAT would include powers to: examine the treatment 
of persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention; make 
recommendations to the relevant authorities with the aim of 
improving the treatment and the conditions of the persons 
 
32.  Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 57/199, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (Dec. 18, 2002), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-one.htm. 
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deprived of their liberty and to prevent torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, taking into 
consideration the relevant norms of the UN; and to submit 
proposals and observations concerning existing or draft 
legislation pertaining to persons being deprived of their liberty. 
Recently, in his Annual Report 2007-08, the Correctional 
Investigator again encouraged the Canadian Government to 
demonstrate its leadership on the international scene by 
signing and ratifying this important human rights 
instrument.33  Moving quickly on ratification would add to 
Canada’s long historical tradition of promoting and defending 
human rights and democratic values, both domestically and 
abroad. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Correctional Ombudsman offices are an effective counter-
weight to the natural tendency of large social control 
institutions to overreact to social and political pressures.  The 
need for independent oversight increases when law and order 
become politicized.  A correctional authority may become lax in 
its attitude towards human rights if it operates within a 
political climate that encourages calls for harsher measures 
against prisoners.  Prison Ombudsman offices, which rely on 
recommendation, persuasion and publicity to effect change, will 
have great difficulties resolving systemic issues in these 
circumstances.34 
As an oversight agency, the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator continues to face many challenges.  However, 
since its creation, the Office has been an important part of 
safeguarding the rights of offenders and in making Canada a 
safer place.  Public safety is enhanced by ensuring that 
offenders are treated fairly, provided the necessary assistance 
to become law-abiding citizens, and safely reintegrated into 
society in a timely and supported fashion. 
 
 
33.  OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
OFFICE OF THE CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR 2007-08, supra note 30. 
34. Zinger, supra note 1, at 135. 
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